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INTRODUCTION
Telemarketing, to many people, is nothing more than a nuisance
and an unwanted intrusion upon home life. Yet for many non-profit
charities, it represents the most effective way to inform people of their
causes, and to raise money. Recently, in National Coalition of Prayer
v. Carter, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit curtailed
the speech that these charities can express.1 Rather than use the
standard of scrutiny outlined by the Supreme Court to deal with
regulations on charitable speech, the Seventh Circuit used a balancing
test that has not been used since the case which created it was decided
thirty-five years ago.2 The test, which dealt with a commercial
restriction, simply weighed the governmental interest of protecting
personal privacy against the free speech rights of the charities.3 In
using this test, the Seventh Circuit circumvented what the concurrence
calls the “firmly-established narrow tailoring requirement.”4 While the
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A. History, December 2002, University of St. Thomas.
1
See Nat’l Coal. of Prayer, Inc., v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2006).
2
Id.; see Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
3
Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736-37
4
Carter, 455 F.3d at 792 (William, J., concurring).

280

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006

1

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 11

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 1

Fall 2006

decision upholding the constitutionality of the statute was not
necessarily incorrect, the Seventh Circuit’s rationale for so holding
was incorrect. The right to free speech is a bedrock principle in our
society, and the restraint of it deserves a proper test. This Comment
contends that the Seventh Circuit, going against precedent, used the
wrong level of scrutiny in its recent decision Carter.5
Section I of this Comment will describe the facts and rationale
behind the majority’s opinion in Carter, Section II will relate the
relevant precedent and case law, Section III will argue the court went
against this precedent in its application of the balancing test, Section
IV will argue that, even if the court had not misinterpreted precedent,
the application of Rowan was incorrect given the distinguishing facts
between the two cases, finally Section V will argue that by applying
Rowan, the Seventh Circuit restrained charitable speech without
proper analysis.
I. THE FACTS AND REASONING BEHIND THE MAJORITY’S OPINION IN
NATIONAL COALITION OF PRAYER V. CARTER
On any given day, more than 300,000 operators employed by
various telemarketing firms are working to contact over 18 million
people.6 Telemarketing is undoubtedly a powerful and enormously
successful tool, but the majority of the public considers it an irritant.7
This public backlash has manifested itself in federal and state laws

5

For the test the majority used see Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736-37.
Augusta Meacham, To Call or Not to Call? An Analysis of Current
Charitable Telemarketing Regulations, 12 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 61, 61 (2004)
(citing Edwin L. Klett & Rochelle L. Brightwell, Exercise in Free Speech or Just a
Pain in the Neck?, 24 PA. LAW. 38, 38 (2002)).
7
Studies show that only .1% of the population likes to receive unsolicited calls
and 69% of people find telemarketing offensive. See Hilary B. Miller & Robert R.
Biggerstaff, Application of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act to Intrastate
Telemarketing Calls and Faxes, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 667, 686 (2000) (citations
omitted).
6
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directed at stopping what is seen as an intrusion upon the privacy of
the home.8 The Indiana statute was enacted for this precise reason.9
In 2001, Indiana enacted the Indiana Telephone Privacy Act
(“the Act”), which established a statewide do-not-call list.10 The Act
8

See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6101-08; N.D. Cent. Code § 51-28 (2006).
The statue in relevant part states:
A telephone solicitor may not make or cause to be made a
telephone sales call to a telephone number if that telephone
number appears in the most current quarterly listing published by
the division.
Ind. Code § 24-4.7-4-1 (2006). However, the Act does not apply
to any of the following:
(1) A telephone call made in response to an express request of the
person called.
(2) A telephone call made primarily in connection with an existing
debt or contract for which payment or performance has not been
completed at the time of the call.
(3) A telephone call made on behalf of a charitable organization
that is exempt from federal income taxation under Section 501 of
the Internal Revenue Code, but only if all of the following apply:
(A) The telephone call is made by a volunteer or an employee of
the charitable organization.
(B) The telephone solicitor who makes the telephone call
immediately discloses all of the following information upon
making contact with the consumer:
(i) The solicitor's true first and last name.
(ii) The name, address, and telephone number of the charitable
organization.
(4) A telephone call made by an individual licensed under Ind.
Code 25-34.1 if:
(A) the sale of goods or services is not completed; and
(B) the payment or authorization of payment is not required;
until after a face to face sales presentation by the seller.
(5) A telephone call made by an individual licensed under IC 27-115.6 or IC 27-1-15.8 when the individual is soliciting an
application for insurance or negotiating a policy of insurance on
behalf of an insurer (as defined in Ind. Code 27-1-2-3).
(6) A telephone call soliciting the sale of a newspaper of general
circulation, but only if the telephone call is made by a volunteer or
an employee of the newspaper.
Ind. Code § 24-4.7-1-1 (emphasis added).
9
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allowed residents of Indiana to place their telephone numbers on this
list and shield themselves from telephone solicitors.11 Under the Act,
commercial telemarketers were completely prohibited from calling any
resident who placed their number on the do-not-call list.12 The Act,
however, exempted certain calls, most particularly those placed by
charitable organizations exempt from federal income taxation under
Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code.13 Organizations falling
under this category are exempt provided that the “telephone call is
made by a volunteer or an employee of the charitable organization
[and] the telephone solicitor who makes the telephone call
immediately discloses. . . [his or her] true first and last name [and t]he
name, address, and telephone number of the charitable organization.”14
In January 2002, Indiana commissioned a professional survey
to study the Act’s effectiveness.15 The survey found that calls by
telemarketers to numbers registered on the do-not-call list fell from an
average of 12.1 per week to 1.9 per week.16 Additionally, “[n]early
98% of the residents who had registered their telephone numbers
reported receiving ‘less’ or ‘much less’ telemarketing interruption
since the Act become law.”17
10

Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 785 (7th Cir. 2006).
Id. “Telephone Solicitor” is defined in the act as: “[A}n individual, a firm,
an organization, a partnership, an association, or a corporation. Ind. Code Ann §
24.7-2-10.
12
Ind. Code § 24-4.7-4-1.
13
Carter, 455 F.3d at 784. Ind. Code § 24-4.7-4-1(3). “The Indiana Attorney
General recognizes an ’implicit exclusion’ for calls soliciting political contributions.
Carter, 455 F.3d at 784. Beyond this, the ITPA specifically allows for exceptions to
the do-not-call list in two other circumstances: (1) it allows newspapers to solicit
sales through telemarketing, as long as the call is made by a volunteer or employee;
and (2) the act permits licensed real estate agents or insurance agents to call numbers
on the do-not-call list under specified circumstances. Ind. Code § 24-4.7-1-1(6) and
24.7-1-1(4) and (5), Carter, 455 F.3d at 784.
14
Carter, 455 F.3d at 784 (quoting Ind. Code § 24-4.7-1-1(3)).
15
Id. at 785.
16
Id.
17
Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 785 (7th. Cir. 2006).
11
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The effectiveness of the Act has lead to an increasing number
of Indiana residents registering their numbers.18 In May of 2003
approximately half of Indiana’s residential lines had been registered on
the list, and by late 2005 that number had increased by another
500,000.19
Plaintiffs, all tax-exempt charities, brought suit alleging that
the prohibition against using professional telemarketing firms to solicit
donations violated their First Amendment rights.20 In cross motions for
summary judgment, the district court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division found in favor of the state, and the
Plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit.21
On appeal the Plaintiffs argued, among other things, that the
regulation was content-based and should be subjected to strict scrutiny
under United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. 22 In
18

See id.
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2006); The
Plaintiffs’ first argument, which is not being discussed in this paper, was that they
had standing to challenge the entire act, not only the exemptions which applied to
them. This assertion was based on two arguments, (1) that the provisions aimed at
commercial speakers showed the “real purpose” of the Act, and (2) commercial
speakers may not be treated more favorably than charitable speakers. Id. The
plaintiffs’ contended in the first argument that the exemptions directly injured the
them because they showed the true motive of the Act, which was to “suppress
‘reviled speakers vis-à-vis more favored speakers.” Id. (citing City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410 (1993)). In Discovery the city passed a law
regulating newsracks for the supposed purposed of clearing the sidewalks of the
numerous newsracks. Id. An exemption for non-commercial handbills however,
allowed 1,438 of the 1.500 newsracks to remain. Id. This exemption was so broad as
to render the legislation ineffective, and bore no relationship to the city’s asserted
interests, the Court therefore struck the statute down. Id. The plaintiffs argued that
Discovery held that “exceptions within an ordinance can show an impermissible
‘true reason’ behind legislation, and any disfavored plaintiff can request the Act be
invalidated on that basis.” Id. The Court dismissed this argument stating “[t]h case
stands for the proposition that commercial speech cannot lightly be singled out as
‘less valuable’ than other speech, and that restrictions on commercial speech, like
19

284

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006

5

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 11

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 1

Fall 2006

Playboy the U.S. Supreme Court dealt with a federal act aimed at
preventing “signal bleed” – when the partial or full portions of audio
or video can be seen from scrambled porn channels.23 The act in
question required cable operators to limit the transmission of the signal
to hours when children were not likely to be watching.24 Since the
restrictions the act placed on the transmission of the channels were
based on the type of content those channels transmitted, the Court
found the restrictions to be “content based” and subject to strict
scrutiny.25
The concurrence argued that it was not a content based
regulation, as the Plaintiff urged, because it was a “’regulation that
serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression . . . even if it has
an incidental effect on certain speakers or messages but not others.’”26
Similarly, the majority found this argument unconvincing, but did not
address why they found the statute not to be content-based, instead
they adopted the level of scrutiny the state suggested, which required
no such analysis.27

restrictions on ‘core’ First Amendment speech, must directly further a legitimate
state interest.” Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2006).
The second standing argument was based on the holding in Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, where the Supreme Court held that a commercial speaker has the
standing to assert non-commercial speakers’ rights. 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973). The
plaintiffs argued this case was the converse, where a non-commercial speaker is
asserting the rights of a commercial speaker. Carter, 455 F.3d at 786. The court,
however, rejected this argument and held that commercial speakers have standing to
assert the rights of non-commercial speakers because the court presumes that speech
accorded greater protection, namely non-commercial speech, will create a stronger
case against regulation. Id. Since restrictions on commercial speech must meet a
lower standard of review, the plaintiffs are not being treated less favorably if they are
allowed to challenge the restrictions which must meet a higher standard, those
affecting non-commercial speech. Id.
23
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 806 (2000).
24
Id. at 806.
25
Id. at 813
26
Id. at 798-99 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)
(William, J., concurring).
27
Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 787-77 (7th Cir.2006).
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The State urged the Seventh Circuit to apply a less traditional
level of scrutiny outlined in the thirty-five year-old Supreme Court
decision Rowan v. United States Postal Service.28 The State’s
argument, which the court eventually adopted, stated that since
Indiana’s statute, aimed at protecting residential privacy, allowed
residents to “opt-in” by placing themselves on a statewide do-not-call
list the only determination the court needed to make was whether the
State’s interest in protecting residential privacy outweighed “the
speaker’s right to communicate his or her message into private
homes.”29
The concurrence, however, was unconvinced by both the
Plaintiff and the majority, and argued for a different level of scrutiny
outlined in the Supreme Court case Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens
for a Better Environment30, and the subsequent Supreme Court cases
interpreting it.31 The Supreme Court in Schaumburg held that
regulations affecting charitable speech must be narrowly tailored to
advance a sufficiently strong governmental interest, without
unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment Freedoms.32 Rowan,
the concurrence argued, must be read not as establishing a stand-alone
test which requires a mere balancing of the parties’ interests, but rather
as only an example of the substantial privacy rights of residents in
their homes, and as support that an opt-in statute protecting that right
can be narrowly tailored.33 Further, the concurrence maintained that by
employing the Rowan balancing test, the majority circumvents the
principle of narrow tailoring analysis, and departs from firmly

28

397 U.S. 728; Carter, 455 F.3d at 787.
Carter, 455 F.3d at 787.
30
444 U.S. 620 (1980).
31
The other cases interpreting Schaumburg were Sec’y of Maryland v. Joseph
H. Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984) and Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C.,
Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
32
Carter, 455 F.3d at 793 (citing Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636-37).
33
Carter, 455 F.3d at 794.
29
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established “bedrock constitutional principles pertaining to charitable
speech.”34
II. RELEVANT CASE LAW CONCERNING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulations on Free Speech
In Carter, the plaintiffs argued that the Act is a “content-based
regulation because its applicability requires analysis of the content of
the message in order to determine to which callers it applies.”35 While
the majority rejects this argument with little comment, the concurrence
devotes some analysis to it, and indeed finds the question of whether
the Indiana Act is a content neutral regulation is a close one.36 It is
therefore relevant to briefly discuss the issue of content neutrality.
The Supreme Court has outlined different levels of scrutiny for
restrictions on free speech based on the type of speech that is being
restrained, or the manner in which the speech is being regulated. One
of the distinctions the Supreme Court has drawn is whether the
regulation is content-neutral or content-based. In a content-based
regulation, the government seeks to restrict speech based on the
content of the message37, and is presumptively invalid and subject to
strict scrutiny.38

34

Id. at 792.
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 21, Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, No. 053995 (7th Cir. July, 28, 2006).
36
Carter, 455 F.3d at 798-99.
37
Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). Examples
of content based regulations include, Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1988)
(finding that a statute prohibiting the display of signs critical to foreign governments
within 500 feet of that government’s embassy was content-based because “[w]hether
individuals may picket in front of a foreign embassy depends entirely upon whether
their picket signs are critical of the foreign government or not”); Simon Schuster,
Inc., v. N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115-16 (1991) (illustrating the
presumptive invalidity of content based regulations, the Court found a law that
required income earned by a convicted criminal from published works describing
his/her crime to be donated to a victim compensation fund was content based
35
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A content neutral speech restriction is one that regulates
without reference to the content of the speech.39 Rather, they regulate
through time, place, and manner restrictions of the speech at issue.
These regulations are not content-based even if they have an incidental
effect on the speakers.40 The test for content-neutral regulations is
intermediate judicial scrutiny, and was outlined by the Court in United
States v. O'Brien.41 A content-neutral regulation is justified if it (1) is
within the constitutional powers of the government, (2) furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest, (3) the government
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, and (4) is an
incidental restriction on free speech that is no greater than essential.42
B. The Level of Scrutiny Afforded Regulations on Commercial Speech
If, however, the regulation is content-based, it may still be
constitutional, and not be strict scrutiny, if it falls into one of the lower
because it imposed a financial burden on speakers because of the content of their
speech).
38
Strict scrutiny requires that the government have a compelling government
interest, and the statute in question be narrowly tailored to further that interest.
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). “If a statute
regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling Government interest. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 126, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989). If a less restrictive alternative
would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) ("[The CDA's Internet indecency
provisions'] burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives
would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was
enacted to serve"); Sable Commc’ns, supra, at 126, ("The Government may ...
regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated
interest"). To do otherwise would be to restrict speech without an adequate
justification, a course the First Amendment does not permit.” Playboy, 529 U.S. at
813.
39
Barry, 485 U.S. at 320.
40
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
41
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
42
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
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valued forms of speech.43 Commercial speech is one such form of
speech. At one time, commercial speech had no first amendment
protection.44 In Valentine, the Court held that government cannot
“unduly burden” the freedom of speech, yet observed that “[w]e are
equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restrain on
government as respects purely commercial advertising.”45
This early hesitance to apply first amendment protections to
commercial speech is shown in Rowan. Indiana’s statute is not the first
state or federal statute intended to protect the privacy of the home
from unwanted intrusion.46 While telemarketing has been the recent
target of legislation, other methods of commercial speech were
targeted earlier. Rowan, the case which the majority in Carter relies on
for its balancing test, was one of the first cases dealing with this issue.
In 1967 Title III of the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act allowed
householders to insulate themselves from advertisements that were
deemed “erotically arousing or sexually provocative.”47 Once the
householder had sent notice to the Postmaster General requesting the
sender of such mailings to stop all future advertisements, the sender
was required to delete the address from all mailing lists owned or
controlled by the sender.48

43

Kerri L. Keller, The Supreme Court Sends First Amendment Guarantees Up
In Smoke By Applying the Commercial Speech Doctrine to Content-Based
Regulations, 36 AKRON L. REV. 133, 140 (2002). Forms of low value speech include
fighting words, incitements-to-riot, and obscenity. Kerri L. Keller, The Supreme
Court Sends First Amendment Guarantees Up In Smoke By Applying the
Commercial Speech Doctrine to Content-Based Regulations, 36 AKRON L. REV.
133, 140 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 379 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring); and Miller, 423
U.S. at 26). Forms of high value speech include political, literary, artistic, and
scientific speech. Id. (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973).
44
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942).
45
Id.
46
See the federal telemarketing statute 15 U.S.C. § 6101-08; Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 (1980)
47
Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728, 729-30 (1970).
48
Id.
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As mentioned above, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the statute based on a test which weighed the mailer’s right to send
against the homeowner’s right to prevent unwanted communication
from entering the household.49 “Weighing the highly important right to
communicate. . . against the very basic right to be free from sights,
sounds, and tangible matter we do not want, it seems to us that a
mailer’s right to communicate must stop at the mailbox of an
unreceptive addressee.”50
The two major factors in the Court’s decision to weigh in favor
of the homeowner were the plenary power of the homeowner under the
Act, and the affirmative action required by the homeowner. In an
opinion that extensively analyzed in depth the legislative history and
prior versions of the Act, the Court found that the opt-in nature of the
Act effectively permitted “a citizen to erect a wall that no advertiser
may penetrate without his acquiescence.”51 This “wall” the
homeowner was allowed to erect could essentially block an unlimited
amount of commercial mailings from being delivered to the citizen’s
home.52 Because the Act required the homeowner to simply state that,
in her subjective viewpoint, the mailings were erotic in nature, the
homeowner could conceivably “prohibit the mailing of a dry goods
catalog because he objects to the contents.”53 This sweeping power,
along with the required affirmative action of opting-in by the
homeowner, placed the Postmaster General in an acceptable
“ministerial” role. The Act did not require the Postmaster General to
decide which of the sender’s mailings were erotic, but simply carried
out the wishes of the homeowner, making it only an enforcing or
ministerial role.
The statute at issue in Rowan was content based, because it
only allowed the homeowner to bar commercial advertisements from
entering his mailbox, making the applicability of the statute based
49

Id. at 737.
Id. at 736-37
51
Id. at 738
52
Id.
53
Id.
50
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upon content of the speakers’ message; yet consistent with their case
law to date, the Court did not analyze it under strict scrutiny.54
Following Rowan, a series of cases changed the level of
scrutiny applied to restrictions on commercial speech. In Bigelow v.
Virginia, the Court first recognized that commercial speech is entitled
to some first amendment protection.55 This protection was defined and
extended in subsequent cases56, but it was not until the Court decided
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission57
that the current governing test for first amendment challenges to
commercial speech was established.58
In Central Hudson, the Court articulated a four prong test to
analyze the constitutionality of a restriction on commercial speech; (1)
the commercial speech must concern a lawful activity, and not be
misleading,(2) there must be a substantial government interest; (3) the
proposed regulation must directly advance the substantial government
interest; and (4) the proposed regulation must be no more extensive
than necessary to advance the government interest.59
Following Central Hudson, the court decided Board of
Trustees of State University of New York v. Fox, and Cincinnati v.

54

The Court in Rowan did not face a content-based argument, and therefore
did not address whether the statute was content-based or not, but subsequent cases
have found that the statute was content-based. See S. Suburban Housing Ctr. v.
Greater S. Suburban 935 F.2d 868, 894 (1991).
55
See 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983). The Bigelow Court balanced the public
interest in receiving information against the state’s interest in preventing the
commercial speech. Kerri L. Keller, The Supreme Court Sends First Amendment
Guarantees Up In Smoke By Applying the Commercial Speech Doctrine to ContentBased Regulations, 36 AKRON L. REV. 133, 140 (2002) (citing Bigelow v. Virginia,
421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975)).
56
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
57
447 U.S. 557, (1980)
58
Joshua A. Marcus, Commercial Speech on the Internet: Spam and the First
Amendment, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 245, 253 (1998).
59
Cent. Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980).
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Discovery Network.60 In Fox, the Court held that a restriction is
narrowly tailored within the context of the Central Hudson test if there
is a reasonable “fit” between the regulation and legislature’s intent.61
This decision seemed to weaken the narrow tailoring requirement of
Central Hudson, since it only required a reasonable fit. However,
Discovery Network emphasized the value of commercial speech under
the reasonable fit requirement.62 In Discovery the city passed a law
regulating commercial newsracks with the supposed purpose of
clearing the sidewalks of the numerous newsracks.63 Non-commercial
newsracks, however, constituted 1,438 of the 1.500 newsracks on the
streets.64 There was no reasonable fit, since this exemption was so
broad as to render the legislation ineffective, and bore no relationship
to the city’s asserted interests.65
Under current case law, the Central Hudson approach is the
governing test for all restrictions on commercial speech.66 The fourth
prong of the Central Hudson test is satisfied when there is a
reasonable fit, as defined by Fox and Discovery, between the
restriction and the purposed governmental interest behind it.

60

492 U.S. 469 (1989); 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
“What our decisions require is a ‘‘fit’ between the legislature’s ends, and the
means chosen to accomplish those ends,’ a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but
reasonable[.]” Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 (citing Posadas v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S.
328, 341 (1986)).
62
“’In the area of noncommercial speech, content-based restrictions. . . are
sustained only in the most extraordinary circumstances. . . By contrast, regulation of
commercial speech based upon content is less problematic.’ While that statement
remains true today as the continued viability of the Cent. Hudson test shows, we
cannot say that the difference in value between commercial speech and
noncommercial speech is as great as it was before Discovery Network.” Pearson v.
Edgar, 153 F.3d 397, 404-05 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Curtis v. Thompson, 840 F.3d
1291, 1297-98 (7th Cir. 1988)).
63
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 418 (1993).
64
Id. at 418.
65
Id. at 424-28.
66
Thompson v. Cent. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002).
61
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C. The Level of Scrutiny Afforded Restrictions on Charitable
Speech
After the Court had extended first amendment protection to
commercial speech, the Court faced a series of challenges to laws
regulating charitable speech. In a succession of cases upholding the
challenges to these restrictions, the Supreme Court defined the method
of review for a restriction on charitable speech.67 While the Court did
not directly face a challenge to the constitutionality of an opt-in
regulation on charitable speech directed at protecting privacy within
the home, this “trilogy” of cases tackling on other restrictions on
charitable speech can be read as establishing the level of scrutiny that
must be applied to such restrictions.68 It is this trilogy of cases, the
concurrence argues, which provides the controlling test for contentneutral restrictions on charitable speech.69
1. Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment
The first case to give protection under the first amendment for
charitable speech was Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Environment.70 In Schaumburg an ordinance requiring any charity
soliciting door-to-door or on-street for contributions was required to
use at least 75% of their receipts for “charitable purposes”.71 In an
67

See Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 (1980);
Sec’y of Maryland v. Munson, 467 U.S. 947 (1984); and Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the
Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
68
Judge Williams refers to these cases as a trilogy in his concurrence in
Carter, but the name has been used in many other scholarly writings and opinions.
See Rita Marie Cain, Nonprofit Solicitation Under the Telemarketing Sales Rule, 57
Fed. Comm. L.J. 81, 89 (2004); John T. Haggerty, Begging and the Public Forum
Doctrine in the First Amendment, 34 B.C. L. REV. 1121, 1132 (1993); Edward J.
Schoen, Joseph S. Falchek, The Do-Not-Call Registry Trumps Commercial Speech,
MICH. ST. L. REV. 483, 524 (2005).
69
Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 792-93 (2006) (William, J.,
concurring).
70
444 U.S. 620 (1980).
71
Id. at 622.
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extensive review of relevant precedent the Supreme Court held that
charitable solicitations, while open to limitations, are a protected form
of speech subject to a higher form of First Amendment protection than
that afforded commercial speech.72 Charitable solicitations are
acknowledged to be commercial in some manner, but protected
because they are “characteristically intertwined with informative and
perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for
particular views on economic, political, or social issues[.]”73
The State named two governmental interests behind the statute,
the protection of the public from fraud, and from invasion of privacy.74
The Court conceded that that these interests were “substantial, “but
they are only peripherally promoted by the 75-percent
requirement[.]”75 In analyzing the regulation’s effectiveness in
promoting the prevention of fraud, the Court concentrated on the fact
that the regulation held that any organization using more than 25
percent of its proceeds on fundraising, salaries and overhead was not
charitable, but commercial, and therefore acted fraudulently in
promoting itself as a charity.76 This was unconstitutionally overbroad
because it neglected to account for organizations that are “primarily
engaged in research, advocacy, or public education” and use donated
funds to support those causes.77 The restriction lumped charities such
72

Id.; August Meacham, THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS, 12 CommLaw Conspectus 61, 68 (2004). The cases the
Supreme Court cited as precedent were Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S.52
(1942); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S.413 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 (1943); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516 (1945); Beard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell,
425 U.S. 610 (1976).
73
Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632
74
Id. at 636.
75
Id. at 636-39
76
Id. at 636
77
Id. at 636-37. The government identified the protection of the public from
fraud, criminal conduct, and invasions of privacy as the interest to be advanced by
the seventy-five percent limitation. Conceding these interests were substantial. The
Court decided they were only "peripherally promoted by the [seventy-five percent]
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as these together with solicitors which were in fact using the
“charitable label as a cloak for profitmaking[.]”78 The Court
emphasized the importance of narrowly drawing the regulation to
serve the legitimate interest: “’Broad prophylactic rules in the area of
free expression are suspect. Precision of regulation must be the
touchstone.’”79 Additionally, the Court suggested ways in which the
Village could have protected against fraud in a manner less intrusive to
free speech; enforcing penal laws against fraud or encouraging
charitable financial transparency would have protected citizens against
fraud and avoided any infringements on charitable free speech.80
The interest in protecting residential privacy was also found to
be related only indirectly to the regulation, and not narrowly tailored.81
Those soliciting on behalf of those charities who met the 75-percent
requirement would not be less intrusive than those representing
charities who did not meet the requirement.82 The solicitation would
disturb householders, regardless of which type of charity they
represented.83 The regulation’s only relation to the protection of
privacy is that it would reduce the total number of solicitors the
householder would see, but any prohibition on solicitation would have
the same effect.84

requirement," and could be "sufficiently served by measures less destructive of First
Amendment interests." In analyzing these interests, the distinction between "funds
for the needy" organizations and "advocacy" organizations was instrumental.
Concerning the village interest in preventing fraud, the Court observed that the
assumption that only those charitable organizations able to meet the seventy-five
percent requirement were non-deceitful unnecessarily crimped the ability of
advocacy organizations to raise and use donated funds to support research, advocacy
and public education activities. Edward J. Schoen, Joseph S. Falchek, The Do-NotCall Registry Trumps Commercial Speech, MICH. ST. L. REV. 483, 509-08 (2005).
78
Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 637.
79
Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
80
Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 638 (1980).
81
Id. at 638
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 638.
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Schaumburg provides significant protection for charitable
speech. On one level it protects charitable solicitation from regulations
governing the final use of charitable funds.85 More significantly,
however, the case creates the level of scrutiny which a content neutral
regulation on charitable speech must reach in order to be held
constitutional, and protects against broad prophylactic measures. In
order for a limitation to stand up to a constitutional challenge, it must
serve a sufficiently strong governmental interest, and be narrowly
drawn. . . to serve. . . [that] interest without unnecessarily interfering
with First Amendment freedoms.”86 Finally, as both the concurrence
and majority concede, this case holds that charitable speech is a
protected form of speech subject to a higher form of First Amendment
protection than that afforded commercial speech.87
2. Secretary of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson, Co.
Following Schaumburg, the Court invalidated a Maryland statute
which prohibited charities from paying solicitors more than 25% of the
85

Schaumburg provides significant protection to charitable organizations and
professional fundraisers. Charitable solicitations are deemed protected speech under
the First Amendment, and charitable organizations are accorded equal status under
the First Amendment whether their purpose is to raise "funds for the needy" or to
engage in advocacy of ideas and information dissemination. Further, percentagebased limitations on the ultimate application of charitable donations are considered
prophylactic, unconstitutional restrictions on free speech, in the absence of a
demonstration that such limitations are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
government interest. Likewise, criminal prosecutions for fraud or trespass, or
communications by potential donors that they do not want to be solicited by
charitable organizations, are deemed less intrusive, more tailored means of
protecting donors against fraud and invasions of their privacy. Edward J. Schoen,
Joseph S. Falchek, The Do-Not-Call Registry Trumps Commercial Speech, MICH.
ST. L. REV. 483, 510 (2005).
86
Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 636-37
(1980). This standard, as the Eighth Circuit notes, is similar to intermediate scrutiny
review of a content-neutral regulation. Fraternal Order of Police v. Stenehjem, 431
F.3d 591, 597 (8th Cir. 2005).
87
Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 773, 791 and at 792 (2006)
(William, J., concurring).

296

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006

17

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 11

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 1

Fall 2006

amount raised.88 Under the statute, charitable organizations were
prohibited from soliciting of any kind if they paid as expenses more
than 25 percent of the amount raised.89 This statute was similar to the
one at issue in Schaumburg except for the creation of an administrative
waiver. The statute permitted the Secretary of State to waive the
restriction for a specific charity, if that charity could show that the 25
percent limitation would effectively prevent it from raising
contributions.90 The primary issue, the Court noted, was whether an
administrative waiver based on a charity’s demonstration of financial
need shows a sufficient narrow tailoring of the statute so as to avoid
the outcome of Schaumburg.91 It was not.
Under the statute, the Secretary of State had no discretion to
waive the 25 percent threshold except for instances involving financial
need.92 The waiver was restricted to instances of financial necessity
due to the high cost of raising contributions.93 The waiver provision
did not provide relief to the charities which were of particular concern
to the Court in Schaumburg, namely to charitable organizations whose
costs exceeded the twenty-five percent threshold out of choice.94
88

Sec’y of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
Id. at 951. The statute in relevant part stated:
(a) A charitable organization other than a charitable salvage organization may
not pay or agree to pay as expenses in connection with any fund-raising activity a
total amount in excess of 25 percent of the total gross income raised or received by
reason of the fund-raising activity. The Secretary of State shall, by rule or regulation
in accordance with the ‘standard of accounting and fiscal reporting for voluntary
health and welfare organizations’ provide for the reporting of actual cost, and of the
allocation of expenses, of a charitable organization into those which are in
connection with a fund-raising activity and those which are not. The Secretary of
State shall issue rules and regulations to permit a charitable organization to pay or
agree to pay for expenses in connection with a fund-raising activity more than 25%
of its total gross income in those instances where the 25% limitation would
effectively prevent the charitable organization from raising contributions.
90
Id. at 951.
91
Id. at 962.
92
Id.
93
Sec’y of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947, 963 (1984).
94
Id. at 963.
89
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Charities whose high costs were due to "’information dissemination,
discussion and advocacy of public issues,’" were barred from carrying
on charitable solicitation activities protected by the First
Amendment.95
Furthermore, the Court ruled that the statute, like the statute in
Schaumburg, was too broad and did not accomplish its objective of
protecting the public against fraud and invasion of privacy.96 By
punishing charitable organizations with high fundraising costs, the
statute relies on the “mistaken premise that high solicitation costs are
an accurate measure of fraud.”97 The statue may prevent some
charities from the fraudulent misdirection of funds away from its
purported goals, but this result is “little more than fortuitous.”98
Equally as possible, is that the statue would restrict First Amendment
speech that results in high costs, due to the nature of the charity’s
mission (such as public education, and advocacy), or restrict speech
which results in high costs simply because of the unpopularity of the
charity’s goals.99 Finally, the Court found that the statue completely
failed in its promotion of the government’s goals; the restriction’s
percentage limitation does nothing to prevent an organization which
wishes to engage in fraudulent behavior from misdirecting funds
solicited funds.100
Munson reiterated the Supreme Court’s holding in
Schaumburg, that charitable solicitation is a protected form of speech
and that a restriction on charitable solicitation must serve a sufficiently
strong governmental purpose, and must be narrowly tailored to
accomplish that purpose without unnecessarily interfering with
protected speech.101
95

Id.
Id. at 966.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Sec’y of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947, 967 (1984).
100
Id.
101
Edward J. Schoen, Joseph S. Falchek, The Do-Not-Call Statute Trumps
Commercial Speech, MICH. ST. L. REV. 483, 513 (2005); see Richard Steinberg,
96
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3. Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc.
In the final case in the trilogy, the Court dealt with a statute
aimed not only at the charities directly, but also at the professional
fundraisers they employed.102 First, the statute prohibited professional
fundraisers from retaining an "unreasonable" or "excessive" fee, and
defined a "reasonable fee".103 Reasonable was defined within the
statute as a percentage of gross revenues raised.104 Fees for
professional solicitors which exceeded 35% of the amount raised were
presumed unreasonable, and fees below 20% were presumed
reasonable.105 Fees falling between 35% and 20% could be deemed
unreasonable, if the state could show that advocacy or dissemination
of information was not involved in the professional solicitor’s
efforts.106 Second, the statute required professional fundraisers to
disclose to potential donors the identity of the charitable organization
for whom it worked, and the average percentage of gross receipts
actually turned over to charities by the fundraiser for all charitable
solicitations conducted in the State within the previous 12 months.107
Finally, the statute required professional fundraisers to obtain a license
before making charitable solicitations.108 All three restrictions were
held to violate the protections of the first amendment.
The Court struck down the first restriction, the reasonable fee
provision, because it was, like the restrictions in Schaumburg and
Munson, not narrowly tailored to fulfill the statute’s goals of fraud
prevention and maximizing the funds which the charity would
Economic Perspectives on Regulation of Charitable Solicitation, 39 CASE W. RES.
775, 777 n.9 (1989).
102
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988)
103
Id. at 784-85.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 786
108
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 786 (1988).
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receive.109 Relying heavily on their decisions in Schaumburg and
Munson the Court once again held “that the solicitation of charitable
contributions is protected speech[.]”110
As in Schaumburg and Munson, we are unpersuaded by
the State's argument here that its three-tiered,
percentage-based definition of "unreasonable" passes
constitutional muster. Our prior cases teach that the
solicitation of charitable contributions is protected
speech, and that using percentages to decide the legality
of the fundraiser's fee is not narrowly tailored to the
State's interest in preventing fraud.111
The statute’s three-tiered approach would not logically prevent
fraud because there was no connection between the percentage of
funds retained by the fundraiser and fundraising fraud.112 A charity
might “choose a particular type of fundraising drive, or a particular
solicitor, expecting to receive a large sum as measured by total dollars
rather than the percentage of dollars remitted.”113 Or, a charity may
wish to sacrifice short-term monetary gains in order to “achieve longterm, collateral, or noncash benefits” such as advocacy or a
dissemination of information[.]”114 Beyond this, the statute would
cause an unacceptable chill on certain kinds of charitable speech,
particularly the dissemination of information and advocacy.115
Requiring professional fundraisers to potentially litigate any time they
wished to engage in advocacy or the dissemination of information, and
to bear the costs of that litigation, might simply result in either driving
professional fundraisers out of North Carolina or discouraging them
109

Id. at 789.
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 793.
113
Id. at 791-92.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 794.
110
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from engaging in those types of charitable campaigns.116 Additionally,
as with Schaumburg and Munson, the Court found that the goal of
fraud prevention could be accomplished without restricting free speech
through the state’s already existing antifraud laws.117
The Court struck also struck down the mandatory disclosure of
information restriction. Forcing the commercial telemarketers to
disclose the percentage of contributions given to the charities for
which they work requires the telemarketers to engage in speech which
they would not usually engage in, and is therefore a content-based
regulation.118 The state’s proffered interest behind the regulation was
to inform “donors how the money they contribute is spent in order to
dispel the alleged misperception that the money they give to
professional fundraisers goes in greater-than-actual proportion to
benefit charity.”119 In the eyes of the Court, however, this was not a
sufficiently compelling interest.120 The state presumed that charities
derive no benefit from money collected but not given to the charity.121
But this assumption is incorrect because “where the solicitation is
116

“[F]undraisers will be faced with the knowledge that every campaign
incurring fees in excess of 35%, and many campaigns with fees between 20% and
35%, will subject them to potential litigation over the "reasonableness" of the fee.
And, of course, in every such case the fundraiser must bear the costs of litigation and
the risk of a mistaken adverse finding by the factfinder, even if the fundraiser and the
charity believe that the fee was in fact fair. This scheme must necessarily chill
speech in direct contravention of the First Amendment's dictates. See Munson, supra,
at 969, 104 S.Ct., at 2853; N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279, 84 S.Ct.
710, 725, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). This chill and uncertainty might well drive
professional fundraisers out of North Carolina, or at least encourage them to cease
engaging in certain types of fundraising (such as solicitations combined with the
advocacy and dissemination of information) or representing certain charities
(primarily small or unpopular ones), all of which will ultimately ‘reduc[e] the
quantity of expression.’” Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S.
781, 794 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19, 39, (1976)).
117
Riley, 487 U.S. at 795.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 798.
120
Id.
121
Id.
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combined with the advocacy and dissemination of information, the
charity reaps a substantial benefit from the act of solicitation itself.”122
Moreover, the Court found that less restrictive means which were more
narrowly tailored could accomplish the statute’s goals.123 For example,
the state could publish the detailed financial data which fundraisers
were required to file, or the state could simply enforce its antifraud
laws to prohibit telemarketers from making false statements or
obtaining money through deceit.124
Since this restriction was content-based, the Court analyzed it
using strict scrutiny, rather than the test outlined in Schaumburg.125
However, the Court held that a regulation affecting charitable speech
must be analyzed as such, even if it purports to regulate only
commercial actors.126 Therefore, as in the case here, where a statute is
directed only at the commercial telemarketers employed by charities, it
necessarily affects charitable solicitation, so it must be subject to the
test for fully protected charitable solicitation.127
Finally, the court invalidated the third restriction, the licensing
requirement. While the state has the power license speech, that power
is not unlimited.128 The licensing requirement was imposed only on
commercial solicitors, who, while their applications were pending,
could not engage in charitable solicitation.129 States may impose
reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions on solicitation through
122

Id.
Id. at 800.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 798.
126
Id. at 796 (quoting Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444
U.S. 620 632 (1980), quoted in Sec’y of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson, Co., 467
U.S. 947, 959-960 (1984).
127
“Thus, where, as here, the component parts of a single speech are
inextricably intertwined, we cannot parcel out the speech, applying one test to one
phrase and another test to another phrase. Such an endeavor would be both artificial
and impractical. Therefore, we apply our test for fully protected expression.” Riley,
487 U.S. at 796.
128
Id. at 802.
129
Id. at 801.
123

302

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006

23

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 11

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 1

Fall 2006

licensing requirements, however, the state must also explicitly state a
time limit in which the license application will be decided.130 Because
the statute in Riley had no provision stating a time in which the
licensor must either issue the license, or allow the applicant to go to
court, the Court found the requirement to be unconstitutional.131
As concurrence correctly argues, this trilogy of Supreme Court
cases clearly states that charitable solicitation, regardless of its
commercial undertones, is a protected form of speech, subject to a
higher form of scrutiny than purely commercial speech.132
Furthermore, these cases outline the level of protection afforded
charitable solicitation.133 Specifically, the Court stated:
But even assuming, without deciding, that such speech
in the abstract is indeed merely “commercial,” we do
not believe that the speech retains its commercial
character when it is inextricably intertwined with
otherwise fully protected speech. Our lodestars in
deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to a compelled
statement must be the nature of the speech taken as a
whole and the effect of the compelled statement
thereon. This is the teaching of Schaumburg and
Munson, in which we refused to separate the
component parts of charitable solicitations from the
fully protected whole. Regulation of a solicitation ‘must
be undertaken with due regard for the reality that
solicitation is characteristically intertwined with
informative and perhaps persuasive speech . . ., and for
the reality that without solicitation the flow of such
information and advocacy would likely cease.134

130

Id. at 802.
Id.
132
Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 792 (2006).
133
Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 836-37.
134
Riley, 487 U.S. at 796.
131
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According to these cases, nonprofit solicitation must receive
the highest First Amendment protection, requiring any regulation to be
narrowly tailored to fulfill a substantial governmental interest.135
B. Seventh Circuit Case Law
The Seventh Circuit, while not directly facing an opt-in statute
restricting charitable speech, is not without precedent either in how
and when it has applied Rowan, or in whether the Circuit has required
narrow tailoring analysis for other types of restrictions on charitable
speech.
First, following Schaumburg the Seventh Circuit “uniformly
applied the narrow-tailoring requirement to regulations affecting
charitable speech.”136 In Gresham v. Peterson, the Seventh Circuit
analyzed a regulation restricting street begging to public places, and
prohibiting completely “aggressive” panhandling.137 The court found
135

Carter, F.3d 455 at 792; Rita Marie Cain, Nonprofit Solicitation Under the
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 57 FED. COMM. L.J. 81, 89 (December, 2004).
136
The concurrence, in footnote 1, lists a number of cases with parentheticals
in support of this statement, it reads: “See, e.g., Wis. Action Coal. v. City of Kenosha,
767 F.2d 1248, 1251-59 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that the Supreme Court "has also
repeatedly stated that a regulation must be narrowly drawn" and applying a narrowtailoring analysis); City of Watseka v. Ill. Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547,
1552-57 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that the Supreme Court routinely requires that a
time, place, and manner regulation be "narrowly tailored" and applying a four-part
test that required consideration of whether the regulation was "narrowly tailored to
serve the government objective"); Nat'l People's Action v. Vill. of Wilmette, 914
F.2d 1008, 1012-13 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court has reaffirmed
"emphatically" that a regulation geared toward protected speech must be narrowly
tailored and applying such an analysis); Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 905-06
(7th Cir. 2000) (noting that regulations must be "narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest" and applying such a test). Carter, 455 F.3d at 793.
137
The statute at issue in Gresham stated:
It shall be unlawful to engage in an act of panhandling in an
aggressive manner, including any of the following actions:
(1) Touching the solicited person without the solicited person's
consent.
(2) Panhandling a person while such person is standing in line and

304

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006

25

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 11

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 1

Fall 2006

that charities and street beggars are indistinguishable in terms of first
amendment protection of their speech, 138 and, relying on Schaumburg,
found the statute to be narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest.139 Additionally, the Gresham court recognized
that the Supreme Court has held that charitable solicitation receives a
higher level of scrutiny that commercial speech, stating:
The Court placed charitable solicitations by
organizations in a category of speech close to the heart
of the First Amendment, and distinguished it from
"purely commercial speech" which is "primarily
concerned with providing information about the
characteristics and costs of goods and services." Id.
Commercial speech, on the other hand, has been placed
lower in the First Amendment food chain, somewhere
between political speech and pornography. It deserves
protection, but authorities are more free to regulate
commercial speech than core-value speech.140
“In Watseka, using intermediate scrutiny for a content-neutral
regulation, the court found the city’s ban on door-to-door solicitation
during certain parts of the day was not “narrowly tailored to achieve

waiting to be admitted to a commercial establishment;
(3) Blocking the path of a person being solicited, or the entrance to
any building or vehicle;
(4) Following behind, ahead or alongside a person who walks
away from the panhandler after being solicited;
(5) Using profane or abusive language, either during the
solicitation or following a refusal to make a donation, or making
any statement, gesture, or other communication which would cause
a reasonable person to be fearful or feel compelled; or,
(6) Panhandling in a group of two (2) or more persons.
Gresham, 225 F.3d at 901-02.
138
Id. at 904.
139
Id. at 905-06.
140
Id. at 904.
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Watseka’s legitimate objectives.”141 Similarly, in City of Kenosha, the
court, relying on Schaumburg, held a time restriction on door-to-door,
charitable solicitation to be constitutional because the “restriction
[was] narrowly tailored to serve the [protectable and subordinating]
interest[.]”142 Finally, in Village of Wilmette, in addressing the
constitutionality of a city ordinance requiring door-to-door solicitors to
submit fingerprints in order to receive a license to solicit, the court
found that Supreme Court has “emphatically” reaffirmed the need for
regulations on protected speech to be narrowly tailored.143
Not only has the Seventh Circuit consistently applied the
narrow tailoring requirement to regulations on charitable speech, but
also, the court has never used Rowan as a stand-alone balancing test
either in the commercial or charitable speech context. “Rather,
consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence, [the Seventh Circuit
has] limited [its] application of Rowan to the framework of whether
the regulation was narrowly tailored (or, relatedly, whether the
government had a sufficiently strong interest in protecting residential
privacy.)”144
In Curtis v. Thompson, the court upheld an Illinois statute
which prohibited real estate agents from soliciting a homeowner to sell
or list their property after the homeowner had provided notice that they
141

City of Watseka v. Ill. Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1558 (7th Cir.

1986)
142

Wisconsin Action Coalition v. City of Kenosha, 767 F.2d 1248, 1251-59
(7th Cir. 1985).
143
Nat’l People’s Action v. Vill. of Wilmette, 914 F.2d 1008, 1012 (7th Cir.
1990).
144
Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 794 (7th Cir. 2006) (William,
J., concurring). Again, the concurrence provides ample authority in support of this
statement, stating in footnote 5: “See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1202 n.8
(7th Cir. 1978) (citing to Rowan for the proposition that the ordinances at issue were
not "appropriately narrow ordinances"); Curtis v. Thompson, 840 F.2d 1291, 130102 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying Rowan to a narrow-tailoring analysis pertaining to a
commercial speech ordinance); S. Suburban Housing Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd.
of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 892-94 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); Pearson v. Edgar, 153 F.3d
397, 403-05 (7th Cir. 1998) (same).” Carter, 455 F.3d at 794 (William J.,
concurring).
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have no desire to sell.145 The statute, like the statute at issue in Rowan
required an affirmative act by the homeowner, in the form of
providing notice, in order to receive the protection under the statute.146
The purpose behind the statute was two-fold, first it was intended to
prevent blockbusting147, and second it was to protect residential
privacy.148 Proceeding under the Central Hudson framework, the court
found the statute did not violate the free speech rights of the
plaintiffs.149 The Curtis court relied heavily on Rowan in its narrow
tailoring analysis, and found it to be a “case almost directly on
point”.150
In South-Suburban Housing Center v. Greater South Suburban
Board of Realtors the court again dealt with a restriction on the
solicitation of real estate listings.151 The municipal ordinance at issue,
which was similar to the one in Curtis, prohibited any person from
soliciting an owner of a dwelling to sell, rent, or list the dwelling any
time after the owner had notified the city clerk of their desire not to be
solicited.152 The clerk was to maintain a list of owners wishing not to
be solicited and furnish a copy of the list to real estate firms belonging
to the local multiple-listing service.153 Like in Curtis, the court
145

Curtis v. Thompson, 840 F.2d 1291, 1293 (1988).
Id. at 1294.
147
Blockbusting is when a real estate agent attempts to persuade white owners
to see their home by stating that property prices will lower because people of color
are moving or have moved into the neighborhood.
148
Curtis, 840 F.2d at 1293.
149
Id. at 1299-1305.
150
Id. at 1301. The Rowan analysis in Curtis did not receive a majority vote,
but as the court in Pearson v. Edgar, discussed infra, states:
Our Rowan analysis in Curtis did not garner a majority of votes.
However, we reaffirmed the Rowan analysis in S. Suburban by a
unanimous vote, so we will treat the Rowan analysis as if it were
established by a majority in Curtis.
Pearson v. Edgar, 153 F.3d 397, 404 (7th Cir. 1997).
151
S. Suburban Housing Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.3d
868, 874 (7th Cir. 1991).
152
Id. at 874-75.
153
Id.
146
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analyzed the restriction under Central Hudson, and, in its narrow
tailoring analysis, relied heavily on Rowan as an example of a
narrowly tailored statute, and as evidence of the Court’s high regard
for the protection of residential privacy.154 Particularly, the court stated
that “we are convinced that the ordinances at issue here and the statute
in Rowan are materially indistinguishable for First Amendment
purposes.”155 The court states:
Both in Rowan and instant case it is the householder
who is required to take the initiative in determining that
he does not wish to receive the material. The Rowan
Court’s broad explanation of a householder’s right to
exclude unwanted mail fails to eliminate the similarity
between the content-specific statue in Rowan and the
content-specific ordinances at issue here. The. . .
distinction between Rowan allowing “a resident to
insulate himself from a particular mailer” and the
authority granted in the ordinances to “exclude an
entire class of mailers based upon occupation and
content,” is immaterial.156
Despite this similarity, however, the court does not apply the
Rowan balancing test, but once again cites to Rowan only in to support
its analysis under Central Hudson.157
In Pearson v. Edgar the statute at issue in Curtis was revisited,
this time with the newly decided Supreme Court case Discovery as a
guiding factor in analyzing the last two prongs of the Central Hudson
test.158 Even though the act required an affirmative act by the
154

Id. at 890-94.
Id. at 893
156
Id. at 894.
157
Id. at 890-94
158
Discovery was the Supreme Court case which gave more protection to
commercial speakers under the Cent. Hudson test. The Seventh Circuit recounted
the history of Pearson v. Edgar at the beginning of the opinion, that synopsis states:
155
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homeowner as a predicate to receiving protection under the statute, the
court again refused to apply the Rowan balancing test.159 Using Rowan
only as an example of a narrowly tailored statute, the Court found this
restriction on commercial speech violated the First Amendment
because it was not narrowly tailored to fit the legitimate governmental
interests.160 Perhaps most significantly, the Pearson court held that its
The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to halt
application of the statute during litigation. The district court found
that the complaint failed to state a claim under the First
Amendment and that the plaintiffs had no likelihood of success on
the merits; the district court therefore denied the motion for a
preliminary injunction. Only plaintiff Curtis pursued an
interlocutory appeal. We affirmed the district court's denial of the
preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further
proceedings in an opinion that became the key to this long running
saga. See Curtis v. Thompson, 840 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1988).
The district court read our opinion in Curtis to preclude any chance
of success for any of the plaintiffs and to establish the law of the
case, and the district court dismissed the case in its entirety. See
Pearson v. Thompson, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8970, No. 86 C
2181, 1989 WL 88367 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 1989). All the plaintiffs
then appealed, and we affirmed on law of the case grounds. See
Pearson v. Thompson, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1814, No. 89-3248,
1992 WL 25349 (7th Cir. Feb. 13, 1992), vacated, Pearson v.
Edgar, 507 U.S. 1015, 123 L. Ed. 2d 441, 113 S. Ct. 1809 (1993).
The plaintiffs petitioned for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme
Court granted the writ, vacated our second opinion, and remanded
the case to us “for further consideration in light of City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 123 L. Ed. 2d
99, 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).” Pearson v. Edgar, 507 U.S. 1015, 123
L. Ed. 2d 441, 113 S. Ct. 1809 (1993). We, in turn, remanded the
case to the district court “for consideration of the impact of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network . . . . The district court should
conduct an evidentiary hearing to allow the parties to create the
appropriate record for determining the constitutionality of Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 38 70-51(d) under the new standards set out by Discovery
Network.” Pearson v. Edgar, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 21600, 1993
WL 315601 (7th Cir. Aug. 12, 1993).153 F.3d 397, 400.
Pearson v. Edgar, 153 F.3d 397, 400 (7th Cir. 1998).
159
Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 795 (7th Cir. 2006).
160
Pearson, 153 F.3d at 404.
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reliance on Rowan in its narrow tailoring analysis under Central
Hudson in its previous cases, Curtis and South Suburban Housing
Center, was weakened by Discovery’s emphasis on reasonable fit.161
Pearson then holds that, within the context of narrow tailoring
analysis, Rowan is not as relevant as it was before Discovery.
C. The Fourth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits’ Holdings
on Charitable Speech Restrictions
The Seventh Circuit stands alone in its current interpretation of
Rowan. Other circuits which have faced similar challenges to
commercial and charitable telemarketing restrictions have all read
Schaumburg, Riley, and Munson to require a narrow tailoring analysis.
In National Federation of the Blind v. F.T.C, the Fourth Circuit
faced a challenge by nonprofit groups to the Federal Trade
Commission’s regulation prohibiting calls to numbers on an opt-in donot-call list.162 Like the Indiana statute in Carter, the regulation
completely prohibited calls by charities using professional
telemarketers, but not those charities using volunteers or in-house
employees.163 The regulation, the Telemarketing Sales Rule, created a
charity specific do-not-call list, which prohibited calls by charities
using professional telemarketers from calling homes which had
previously asked not to be called by that specific charity.164 However,
those charities using volunteers or in-house employees were exempt
from the act and its restrictions.165 The Fourth Circuit upheld the
restriction, based on a governing test stemming from Schaumburg,
Munson, and Riley.166 Under this test, in order for a regulation to
withstand a constitutional attack, it must “(1) ‘serve a sufficiently
strong, subordinating interest that the [government] is entitled to
161

Id.
420 F.3d 331, 334 (4th Cir. 2005).
163
Id. at 335.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 336.
166
Id. at 338.
162
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protect’ and (2) [be] narrowly drawn. . . to serve the interest without
unnecessarily interfering with the First Amendment freedoms.”167
The Fourth Circuit relied upon Rowan, but only to show that the
protection of household privacy is a sufficiently strong governmental
interest, and that the FTC’s regulation was narrowly tailored because it
was opt-in.168 According to the court:
The parallels between the law at issue in Rowan and the
do-not-call list in this case are unmistakable. If
consumers are constitutionally permitted to opt out of
receiving mail which can be discarded or ignored, then
surely they are permitted to opt out of receiving phone
calls that are more likely to disturb their peace. In this
way, a do-not-call list is more narrowly tailored to
protecting privacy than was the law in Rowan.169
Similarly, in Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. F.T.C. the
Tenth Circuit faced a challenge to the same Federal Trade
Commission’s regulations, but this case dealt with the restrictions
imposed on commercial telemarketers.170 Like the restrictions on
commercial telemarketers in the Indiana Act at issue in Carter, the
federal Act prohibited commercial telemarketers from calling numbers
that had been placed on the national do-not-call registry.171 Since it
was a challenge on commercial restrictions, the court applied Central
Hudson.172 Again, the Tenth Circuit relied on Rowan, and extensively
analyzed the decision, but only “within the context of considering
167

Carter, 455 F.3d at 797 (Williams, J., concurring) (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of
the Blind v. F.T.C., 420 F.3d 331, 338 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Sec’y of Maryland v.
Joseph H. Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947, 960-61 (1984) (quoting Vill. of Schaumburg
v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 636-37 (1980))).
168
Carter, 455 F.3d at 798; Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 420 F.3d at 342.
169
Carter, 455 F.3d at 798 (Williams, J., concurring) (emphasis excluded)
(citing Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 420 F.3d at 342).
170
(“Mainstream Marketing II”), 358 F.3d 1228, 1234 (10th Cir. 2004).
171
Id.
172
Id. at 1236.
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whether the federal do-not-call list was narrowly tailored.”173 The
court found Rowan’s opt-in feature as strong evidence that the federal
statute was narrowly tailored, specifically the court stated:
Like the do-not-mail regulation approved in Rowan, the
national do-not-call registry does not itself prohibit any
speech. Instead, it merely “permits a citizen to erect a
wall. . . that no advertiser may penetrate without his
acquiescence.” See Rowan 397 U.S. at 738, 90 S.Ct.
1484. almost by definition, the do-not-call regulations
block calls that would constitute unwanted intrusions
into the privacy of consumers who have signed up for
the list. Moreover, it allows consumers who feel
susceptible to telephone fraud or abuse to ensure that
most commercial callers will not have an opportunity to
victimize them. Under the circumstances we address in
this case, we conclude that the do-not-call registry’s
opt-in feature renders it a narrowly tailored commercial
speech regulation.174
Perhaps most significantly, in a “precursor case to Mainstream
Marketing II, the Tenth Circuit cited to [The Seventh Circuit] decision
in Pearson, noting that ‘[o]ther courts have relied on Rowan’s analysis
in finding that similar mechanisms of private choice in solicitation
restrictions weigh in favor of finding a ‘reasonable fit[,]’ and held that
‘Rowan demonstrates that the element of private choice in an opt-in
feature is relevant for purposes of analyzing ‘reasonable fit’’”175.
Finally, in Fraternal Order of Police v. Stenehjem, the Eighth
Circuit confronted a North Dakota statute remarkably like the Indiana
173

Carter, 455 F.3d at 795 (Williams, J., concurring) (citing see Mainstream
Marketing II, 358 F.3d at 1243-44).
174
Mainstream Marketing II, 358 F.3d at 1244-45.
175
Carter, 455 F.3d at 795-96 (William, J., concurring) (citing F.T.C. v.
Mainstream Marketing, Inc. (“Mainstream Marketing I”), 345 F.3d 850, 856 (10th
Cir. 2003) (citing Anderson v. Treadwell, 294 F.3d 453, 462-63 (2d Cir. 2002);
Pearson v. Edgar, 153 F.3d 397, 400, 404 (7th Cir. 1998))).

312

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006

33

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 11

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 1

Fall 2006

statute at issue in Carter. Using the test outlined in Schaumburg, the
court upheld a restriction on charitable phone solicitation.176 The
North Dakota statute prohibited charitable solicitation by professional
telemarketers, but granted an exemption for calls made by volunteers
or in-house employees.177 Again, after finding the statute content
176

Fraternal Order of Police v. Stenehjem, 431 F.3d 591 (8th Cir. 2005).
Id.; Carter, 455 F.3d at 797. The North Dakota Statute in
relevant part states:
In this chapter, unless the context or subject matter otherwise
requires, the terms shall have the meanings as follows:
1. "Automatic dialing-announcing device" means a device that
selects and dials telephone numbers and that, working alone or in
conjunction with other equipment, disseminates a prerecorded or
synthesized voice message to the telephone number called.
2. "Caller" means a person, corporation, firm, partnership,
association, or legal or commercial entity that attempts to contact,
or that contacts, a subscriber in this state by using a telephone or a
telephone line.
3. "Caller identification service" means a telephone service that
permits telephone subscribers to see the telephone number of
incoming telephone calls.
4. "Established business relationship" means a relationship
between a seller and consumer based on a free trial newspaper
subscription or on the consumer's purchase, rental, or lease of the
seller's goods or services or a financial transaction between the
consumer and seller, within the twenty-four months immediately
preceding the date of a telemarketing call.
5. "Message" means any telephone call, regardless of its content.
6. "Subscriber" means a person who has subscribed to residential
telephone services from a telephone company or the other persons
living or residing with the subscribing person, or a person who has
subscribed to wireless or mobile telephone services.
7. "Telephone solicitation" means any voice communication over a
telephone line for the purpose of encouraging charitable
contributions, or the purchase or rental of, or investment in,
property, goods, services, or merchandise, including as defined in
subsection 3 of section 51-15-03, whether the communication is
made by a live operator, through the use of an automatic dialingannouncing device, or by other means. Telephone solicitation does
not include communications:
a. To any subscriber with that subscriber's prior express written
177
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neutral based on Ward, the Eighth Circuit found that “the appropriate
[test] for regulation of professional charitable solicitation is derived
from [Schaumburg].”178 Citing previous Eighth Circuit precedent, the
court explained that Schaumburg required an inquiry into: “(a)
whether the State had a sufficient or ‘legitimate’ interest; (b) whether
the interest identified was ‘significantly furthered’ by a narrowly
request, consent, invitation, or permission.
b. By or on behalf of any person with whom the subscriber has an
established personal or business relationship.
c. By or on behalf of a charitable organization that is exempt from
federal income taxation under section 501 of the Internal Revenue
Code, but only if the following applies:
(1) The telephone call is made by a volunteer or employee of the
charitable organization; and
(2) The person who makes the telephone call immediately discloses
the following information upon making contact with the consumer:
(a) The person's true first and last name; and
(b) The name, address, and telephone number of the charitable
organization.
d. By or on behalf of any person whose exclusive purpose is to poll
or solicit the expression of ideas, opinions, or votes, unless the
communication is made through an automatic dialing-announcing
device in a manner prohibited by section 51-28-02.
e. By the individual soliciting without the intent to complete, and
who does not in fact complete, the sales presentation during the
call, but who will complete the sales presentation at a later face-toface meeting between the individual solicitor or person who makes
the initial call and the prospective purchaser.
f. By or on behalf of a political party, candidate, or other group
with a political purpose, as defined in section 16.1-08.1-01.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-28-01 (year). The North Dakota Act also makes the
following prohibitions:
A caller may not make or cause to be made any telephone
solicitation to the telephone line of any subscriber in this state
who, for at least thirty-one days before the date the call is made,
has been on the do-not-call list established and maintained or used
by the attorney general under section 51- 28-09 or the national donot-call registry established and maintained by the federal trade
commission under title 16, Code of Federal Regulations, part 310.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-28-06 (emphasis added).
178
Stenehjem, 431 F.3d at 597
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tailored regulation; and (c) whether the regulation substantially limited
charitable solicitations.179 Following in the steps of the Fourth and
Tenth Circuits, the Eighth Circuit cited Rowan extensively, but again,
only in an effort to establish the legitimate interest of the State in
protecting residential privacy, and that the opt-in nature of the statute
made the statute narrowly tailored.180
III. THE MAJORITY MISINTERPRETS CASE LAW BY RELYING ON ROWAN
It was against this backdrop of Supreme Court precedent and
subsequent Circuit Court interpretations that the Seventh Circuit
decided Carter. Rather than apply the scrutiny for charitable
restrictions outlined in Schaumburg, the Court relies on the balancing
test of Rowan. This was the incorrect decision because, to begin with,
Rowan dealt with a commercial restriction, and precedent clearly
shows that commercial and charitable speech are subject to different
levels of scrutiny. Additionally, the court, in coming to their decision,
misread, or in some cases ignored, Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit
authority, as well as the persuasive holdings of its sister courts.
A. Rowan Deals With A Regulation on Commercial Speech,
Not Charitable Speech
As a primary issue, Rowan did not deal with charitable
solicitation. Rowan prohibited the sending of commercial mailings.
This, as the concurrence correctly states, is a significant difference
given the fact that both the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit
have held that restrictions on charitable speech receive greater
protection than restrictions on commercial speech.181 Speech aimed at
soliciting funds can be divided into two categories. Commercial
solicitation, whose expression is related solely to the economic interest
179

Id.
Id.
181
Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 793 (7th Cir. 2006); Gresham
v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 2000).
180
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of the speaker182, and charitable solicitation, which has, as one of its
goals economic benefit, but which is characteristically intertwined
with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for
particular causes or for particular views on economic, political, or
social issues. These two categories have separate levels of scrutiny,
neither of which is the Rowan balancing test.
As explained supra, the test which should be used for
restrictions on charitable solicitation is the one outlined in
Schaumburg, and Central Hudson, decided ten years after Rowan,
formulated the test which governs commercial restrictions.183 As the
concurrence correctly points out, the Central Hudson test is similar to
the Schaumburg test, yet charitable solicitations receive heightened
scrutiny and, “unlike commercial regulations, are presumptively
invalid if they are not content neutral.”184 “[W]hatever Rowan has to
say regarding the test applicable to First Amendment challenges
involving commercial speech must be filtered through subsequent
Supreme Court authority. . . [, the Rowan] test is no longer the
controlling law even in the commercial speech arena, much less in the
more highly protected charitable speech context.”185 Thus, even in the
context of regulations on commercial speech, Rowan is not the
controlling test.
Not only did the Seventh Circuit misapply an invalid
commercial test to a restriction on charitable speech, but also, by
ignoring the difference between commercial speech and charitable
speech, the majority has effectively stripped the plaintiffs of their right
to have their case analyzed under the heightened level of scrutiny
afforded charitable speech.

182

Cent. Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 561 (1980).
183
447 U.S. 557.
184
Carter, 455 F.3d at 794 n.3 (citing Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 636-37 (1980); Gresham, 225 F.3d at 904; Stenehjem,
431 F.3d 59).
185
Carter, 455 f.3d 783, 794 (see Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565) (William, J.,
concurring).
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B. The Majority Ignores Supreme Court Precedent
Rowan has not become obsolete, in fact, as the majority
correctly states, it has never been explicitly overruled by the Supreme
Court.186 It has been cited frequently by both the Supreme Court and
Seventh Circuit, but, as the majority concedes, only in support of the
state’s great interest in protecting residential privacy, or in narrow
tailoring analysis.187 In order to apply Rowan in the manner it did, the
court had misinterpret Supreme Court precedent.
As explained above, Schaumburg undoubtedly held that
charitable solicitation is under the protection of the first amendment.
“Charitable solicitations. . . are within the protections of the First
Amendment.”188 Further, the Court in Schaumburg was well aware of
the Rowan case, and cited to it, but not in support of a balancing
test.189 Instead, the Court cited to Rowan during its narrow tailoring
analysis, as an example of less intrusive methods of protecting
residential privacy than through the state’s method at issue in
Schaumburg.190 The Schaumburg test was solidified as the governing
test for regulations affecting charitable solicitation by the following
cases Munson and Riley. In both these cases the Court faced
challenges to regulations on charitable solicitation, and while the state
interests behind the regulations were legitimate, they failed because
186

Carter, 455 F.3d at 789.
Id.
188
Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 633 (1980); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of
N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 789 (1988) (applying the test outlined in Schaumburg and
stating “Our prior cases teach that the solicitation of charitable contributions is
protected speech”).
189
Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 639.
190
Specifically, the Court stated: “Other provisions of the ordinance, which are
not challenged here, such as the provision permitting homeowners to bar solicitors
from their property by posting signs reading ‘No Solicitors or Peddlers Invited.’ §
22-24, suggest the availability of less intrusive and more effective measures to
protect privacy.” Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 633 (citing Rowan v. Post Office Dep’t.,
397 U.S. 728 (1970)).
187
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they were not narrowly tailored.191 Under Rowan, narrow tailoring
analysis is not required, but in its narrow tailoring analyses in
subsequent cases the Court has cited to Rowan frequently.192 In fact,
the Supreme Court has never used Rowan in support of a stand-alone
balancing test, but has limited Rowan’s application to either
“establish[ing] the significance of residential privacy interests and/or
to address the narrow tailoring or least restrictive means
requirements.”193
The majority dismisses the concurrence’s argument that
Supreme Court precedent, specifically Schaumburg, establishes the
test for restrictions on charitable solicitation by stating that in
Schaumburg:
[T]he Court evaluated an ordinance that would forbid
certain charities from soliciting door-to-door or in public
streets. The Court specifically noted that the statute was
191

See Sec’y of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947, 966-67
(1984) and Riley, 487 U.S. at 788-803.
192
In footnote 4, the concurrence cites examples of the Supreme Court using
Rowan only in narrow tailoring analysis or in support of the state’s legitimate
purpose in protecting residential privacy:
See, e.g., Vill. of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 639 (noting the interest
in residential privacy and citing Rowan within a narrow-tailoring
analysis); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of
N.Y.., 447 U.S. 530, 542 n.11, 100 S. Ct. 2326, 65 L. Ed. 2d 319
(1980) (same); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471, 100 S. Ct.
2286, 65 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1980) (citing Rowan to establish the
substantial interest in residential privacy); Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72, 77-78, 103 S. Ct. 2875, 77 L. Ed.
2d 469(1983) (same); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 482-85, 108
S. Ct. 2495, 101 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1988) (same); United States v.
Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814-15, 120 S. Ct.
1878, 146 L. Ed. 2d 865(2000) (citing Rowan within a leastrestrictive-means analysis); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 71718, 720, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 147 L. Ed. 2d 597 (2000) (citing Rowan
within the context of a narrow-tailoring analysis).
Carter, 455 F.3d at 794 n.4.
193
Id. at 794.
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“not directed to the unique privacy interests of persons
residing in their homes because it applies not only to
door-to-door solicitation, but also to solicitation on
public streets and public ways.”194
This argument, however, fails because the quote the majority
used in support of its dismissal of Schaumburg discussed whether the
restrictions were narrowly tailored. In Schaumburg the Court stated
that the 75% requirement was not narrowly tailored because it was
related to the protection of privacy “in only the most indirect of
ways.”195 The restrictions imposed by the statute were only
peripherally aimed at protecting privacy, since “householders are
equally disturbed by solicitation on behalf of organizations satisfying
the 75% requirement as they are by solicitation on behalf of other
organizations”, and because it is directed at both door-to-door
solicitation and solicitation on public streets.196 Schaumburg
distinguished Rowan only to illustrate a statute which is narrowly
tailored to protect residential privacy, not in an effort to establish the
validity of the Rowan balancing test.
C. The Majority in Carter Ignores Seventh Circuit Precedent
The majority in Carter similarly ignores Seventh Circuit
precedent. Following Schaumburg the Seventh Circuit “uniformly
applied the narrow-tailoring requirement to regulations affecting
charitable speech.”197 However, in the opinion the court does not even
address Gresham, Watseka, City of Kenosha, or Village of Wilmette,
all Seventh Circuit cases dealing with various restrictions on charitable
speech, and all requiring narrow tailoring analysis.198 Presumably, the
court rejects these cases for the same reason it rejected the Supreme
194

Id. at 789 (quoting Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 638-39).
Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 638.
196
Id.
197
Carter, 455 F.3d at 793.
198
The facts and holdings of these cases are recounted supra.
195
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Court’s decision in Schaumburg, namely that the court has not been
presented with an “opt-in statute that applies only to private residences
in a manner that effectively protects residential privacy.”199 Since the
majority does not address these cases, it is difficult to guess exactly
why they dismissed previous Seventh Circuit cases, however, the
argument for dismissing Schaumburg fails for the same reason
outlined supra.
Beyond Seventh Circuit precedent concerning charitable
restrictions, the majority also dismisses the Seventh Circuit case law
concerning opt-in commercial restrictions, a situation where it has
consistently applied the narrow tailoring requirement.200 In fact, when
dealing with a commercial restriction, the court has never used Rowan
as a stand-alone balancing test. “Rather, consistent with Supreme
Court jurisprudence, [the Seventh Circuit has] limited [its] application
of Rowan to the framework of whether the regulation was narrowly
tailored (or, relatedly, whether the government had a sufficiently
strong interest in protecting residential privacy.)”201
For challenges to commercial speech restrictions, the Seventh
Circuit has continually held that Rowan is indeed relevant, but only
within the framework of the subsequent test laid out by the Supreme
Court in Central Hudson. In Curtis, Rowan was “almost directly on
point”202, and in South Suburban Housing Center, the statue at issue
and the statute in Rowan were “materially indistinguishable for First
199

Carter, 455 F.3d at 789.
See the Seventh Circuit history supra.
201
Carter, 455 F.3d at 794. Again, the concurrence provides ample authority in
support of this statement, stating in footnote 5:
See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1202 n.8 (7th Cir. 1978)
(citing to Rowan for the proposition that the ordinances at issue
were not "appropriately narrow ordinances"); Curtis v. Thompson,
840 F.2d 1291, 1301-02 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying Rowan to a
narrow-tailoring analysis pertaining to a commercial speech
ordinance); S. Suburban Housing Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd.
of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 892-94 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); Pearson
v. Edgar, 153 F.3d 397, 403-05 (7th Cir. 1998) (same).
Carter, 455 F.3d at 794 n. 5.
202
Curtis v. Thompson, 935 F.2d 1291, 1300-01 (7th. Cir. 1988).
200
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Amendment purposes”203, but in both cases the court not only refused
to use the Rowan balancing test, but cited to Rowan frequently only as
support for its analysis under the Central Hudson test. Additionally, in
Pearson, the Seventh Circuit declared its reliance on Rowan in its
narrow tailoring analysis and discussion of legitimate state interests
“weakened” by the subsequent Supreme Court case Discovery.204
In a footnote, the majority dismisses the argument that Pearson
rejected the Rowan framework.205 The majority noted that Pearson
distinguished the statute at issue from the statute in Rowan.206 Rowan,
was not completely analogous to Pearson, the majority argues,
because in Pearson the homeowner could not “ban any bothersome
solicitation but only real estate solicitation”, whereas in Rowan, the
homeowner “could prevent any material from entering his home[.]”207
203

S. Suburban Housing Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban 935 F.2d 868, 893 (1991).
Pearson v. Edgar, 153 F.3d 397, 404.
205
The footnote stated:
In that case [Pearson], the statute in question forbade real estate
agents from "solicit[ing] an owner of residential property to sell or
list such residential property at any time after such person or
corporation has notice that such owner does not desire to sell such
residential property." Pearson, 153 F.3d 397 at 399. Notably, this
statute does not limit its ban to times when the homeowner is
inside the home that he or she owns. Perhaps that is why the
district court in that case found that the state had produced "no
evidence . . . that real estate solicitation harms or threatens to harm
residential privacy." Id. at 404. We noted in that case that the
Rowan test was not applicable to such an underbroad statute, even
though the statute was of an opt in nature. Id. at 404 ("Here the
state, not the homeowner, has made the distinction between real
estate solicitations and other solicitations without a logical
privacy-based reason." (emphasis added)). Therefore, we cannot
agree with our concurring colleague that Pearson rejected the
Rowan framework with respect to an opt-in statute that is not
underbroad and is confined to communications aimed solely at a
residence.
Carter, 455 F.3d at 790.
206
Id.
207
Pearson, 153 F.3d at 404.
204
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“[T]he Rowan test was not applicable to such an underbroad statute,
even though the statute was of an opt in nature.”208
The majority, however, fails to realize that this exact argument
could be used to distinguish Carter from Rowan. The homeowner in
Carter can not ban any bothersome telemarketing call; newspapers,
real estate and insurance agents, calls soliciting political contributions,
and charities using in-house employees or volunteers are all exempt
from the do-not-call list.209
D. Other Circuits Have Analyzed Restrictions Similar to the One at
Issue in Carter and Have Not Used the Test Outlined in Rowan
Besides incorrectly distinguishing Supreme Court precedent,
the Seventh Circuit quickly dismisses the rulings of the Fourth, Eighth
and Tenth Circuits.210 The majority in Carter, in an effort to explain
why their sister circuits opted for more traditional methods of review
states: “[n]either the Eighth Circuit nor the Tenth Circuit directly
addressed a Rowan argument similar to the one the State presses here.
Instead they reversed by employing more standard First Amendment
analysis.”211 This statement is true, but misleading.212 In Stenehjem, an
amicus brief filed by the Indiana Attorney General urged the Eighth
Circuit to adopt a Rowan balancing test, yet unsurprisingly the court
declined and analyzed the restrictions under the test on charitable
restrictions outlined in Schaumburg, and cited to Rowan only as
support that an opt-in feature helps to show the statute is narrowly
tailored.213
208

Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 790.
Id. at 784. The concurrence makes this exact argument in response to the
majority’s determination that the Act places the Indiana Attorney General in a
“ministerial” role. Id. at 796. The discussion of this argument is dealt with below.
210
Id. at 788.
211
Id.
212
Id. at 797 (Williams J. concurring).
213
Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 798 (7th Cir. 2006)
(Williams, J., concurring) (citing Brief for State of Indiana et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellant, at 2, 13).
209
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Similarly, in Mainstream Marketing II, several states
supporting the federal regulations on commercial telemarketers filed
amicus briefs arguing that Rowan created a balancing test.214 Not
surprisingly the Tenth Circuit chose not to adopt Rowan’s balancing
test, but instead employed the test outlined in Central Hudson for
restrictions on commercial speech.215
Additionally all three Circuits addressed Rowan and relied on it
in support of their respective narrow tailoring analyses, at the very
least the Eighth, Tenth and Fourth Circuits were aware of the
balancing test in Rowan, and consciously choose not to accept it.216
“Thus, at a minimum , these circuits did not interpret Rowan as
requiring nothing more than a balancing of interests. More likely, they
appropriately disregarded the states’ request for a truncated balancingof-interest test and instead applied Rowan solely within the constraints
created by subsequent Supreme Court Authority.”217
E. The Majority’s Use of “Underbroad” is Misplaced and Confusing
After misinterpreting case law and applying Rowan, a
case which requires no narrow tailoring analysis, the majority
proceeded to analyze the statute under the “reasonable fit”
doctrine, outlined in a manner which resembles narrow
tailoring analysis.218
Once we have decided to apply the Rowan analysis, it
would seem the case is resolved, since the Supreme
214

Carter, 455 F.3d at 798 (citing Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc.
(“Mainstream Marketing II”), 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004) and Brief for State of
California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants in Case No. 03-1429 and
Supporting appellees in Case No. 03-9571 at 1-3, Mainstream Marketing Services,
Inc., 358 F.3d 1228 (Nos. 03-1429, 03-6258, 03-9571, 03-9594).
215
Carter, 455 F.3d at 798 (citing Mainstream Marketing II, 358 F.3d at 124244.
216
Id. at 798 (William, J., concurring).
217
Id.
218
Id. at 790-91.
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Court has already made clear that citizens in their own
homes have a stronger interest in being free from
unwanted communication than a speaker has in
speaking in a manner that invades residential privacy.
However, the Plaintiffs strenuously argue that the Act is
underbroad and therefore prohibited under Discovery
Network. We agree that if the Act was so underbroad as
to fail to materially advance the State’s interest in
residential privacy, Plaintiffs might prevail even under
Rowan.219
The majority’s reliance on Discovery is confusing, given that
Discovery was a case analyzing a restriction on commercial speech,
and was decided using the Central Hudson framework.220
Additionally, Discovery, and its predecessor Fox, analyze the term
“reasonable fit” within the context of the last two prongs of the
Central Hudson test which both deal with narrow tailoring analysis.221
This makes the majority’s refusal to use proper narrow tailoring
analysis even more confusing. Furthermore, Carter dealt with a
restriction on charitable speech, and Discovery has not been cited,
either by the Supreme Court or the Seventh Circuit, in the narrow
tailoring analysis of a restriction on charitable speech.
Adding to the confusion is the majority’s reliance, within its
“underbroad” analysis, on Hill v. Colorado,222 a case which upheld a
statute that “prohibited knowingly approaching within eight feet of
another person, without that person’s consent, ‘for the purpose of
passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral
protest, education, or counseling with such person. . . ‘ within

219

Id.
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 416 (1993)
221
Id.
222
The majority states: “the Act’s legitimacy is bolstered by the Supreme
Court holding in Hill v. Colorado.” Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 790.
220
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designated areas surrounding health care clinics.”223 The Supreme
Court held the statute to be constitutional because it was a content
neutral, valid time, place, and manner restriction, and was narrowly
tailored to serve a significant and legitimate governmental interests.224
The majority in Carter, while neglecting to engage in a proper narrow
tailoring analysis, cites to two commercial restriction cases (Discovery
and Hill) in support of its underbroad analysis, both of which engage
in extensive narrow tailoring analysis.
IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT INCORRECTLY SEES INDIANA’S STATUTE
AS GIVING ONLY MINISTERIAL POWER TO THE
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
Even if the court in Carter had not misinterpreted Supreme
Court and Seventh Circuit precedent, the use of Rowan’s balancing
test would still be incorrect. In Rowan, the Court’s decision to weigh
in favor of the homeowner, relied heavily on the plenary power of the
homeowner under the act, and the affirmative action required by the
homeowner. The opinion extensively analyzed the legislative history
and prior versions of the act. A prior version of the act could have
been read to prohibit only future mailings from the sender, or “future
mailings of similar materials.”225 “The section as originally reported
by the House Committee prohibited ‘further mailings of such
pandering advertisements’ s 4009(a), ‘further mailings of such matter,’
s 4009(b), and ‘any further mailings of pandering advertisements,’ s
4009(c).226 This prior version would have taken discretion away from
the householder by interposing the “Postmaster General between the
sender and the addressee and, at least, creat[ed] the appearance if not

223

The purpose of the statute was intended to shelter women visiting abortion
clinics from unwanted encounters with abortion protestors. Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v.
Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 790 (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 706 (2000)).
224
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725 (2000).
225
Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 732 (1970).
226
Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 90-722, at 125 (1967)).
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the substance of governmental censorship.”227 The final version of the
act, however, resolved any constitutional issues by giving the
householder “complete unfettered discretion in electing whether or not
he desired to receive further material from a particular sender.”228 The
Court found that the opt-in nature of the act effectively permitted “a
citizen to erect a wall that no advertiser may penetrate without his
acquiescence.”229 This “wall” could essentially block out an unlimited
amount of commercial mailings the homeowner deemed undesirable.
Because the act required simply the homeowner to state that in her
subjective viewpoint, the mailings were erotic in nature, the
homeowner could conceivably “prohibit the mailing of a dry goods
catalog because he objects to the contents.”230 This sweeping power,
along with the required affirmative action of opting-in by the
homeowner placed the Postmaster General in a “ministerial” role. The
act did not require the Postmaster General to decide which of the
sender’s mailings were erotic, but simply carried out the wishes of the
homeowner, making it only an enforcing or ministerial role.
In an effort to analogize the Indiana statute to Rowan, the
majority concentrates on the “ministerial” evaluation, and reviews
extensively the Supreme Court’s legislative history examination in
Rowan.231 The calls which were exempt were well defined and
involved little discretion to decide if a call was placed by a
professional telemarketer on behalf of a charity, or by a volunteer or
in-house employee of the charity.232 The majority concluded that the
role of the Indiana Attorney General was more analogous to the
ministerial role of the Postmaster General.233
227

Rowan, 397 U.S. at 735.
Id. at 734.
229
Id. at 738
230
Id.
231
Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, 455 F.3d 783, 788-89 (7th Cir. 2006).
232
Id. at 789.
233
The Seventh Circuit concluded that:
[T]he Act places the Attorney General of Indiana in a ‘ministerial’
role more analogous to that of the Postmaster General in the final
legislation in Rowan than that act’s objectionable predecessor. The
228

326

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006

47

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 11

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 1

Fall 2006

The majority’s concentration on the ministerial role is
misplaced.234 The majority’s reasoning that the Attorney General, like
the Postmaster General, is given sole discretion to decide only if the
call was placed by a charity’s volunteer or in-house employee, or if it
was placed by a professional telemarketing employee on behalf of the
charity, is erroneous because it considers only the state’s involvement
in enforcing the statute.235 While the Act in Rowan was limited in
language to material that the homeowner found erotic or sexually
arousing, there was no objective test which could prevent the
homeowner for prohibiting any commercial mailing as long as they
deemed sexually arousing.236 By allowing the homeowner complete
control over what material could be prohibited from entering the
household Act at issue in Rowan truly allowed the homeowner
complete control.237 In contrast, the Indiana statute at issue in Carter
left exemptions for phone calls which the homeowner could not elect
to block.238 The majority ignored the fact that the actual passage of the
law with “numerous exemptions is an act of immersing itself in the
regulation of the different forms of telemarketing speech.”239 By
creating exceptions to the law, Indiana created telemarketing calls

telephone calls that the Attorney General must allow to be placed
to numbers on the do-not-call list are very well defined. For
example, it involves little discretion to decide if the call was placed
on behalf of a tax-exempt charity, or if the person who placed the
call was a volunteer or employee of that charity. We therefore
disagree with the view that Rowan is inapplicable merely because
the Act imposes well-defined restrictions on precisely what
protections from unwanted communication a residential phone
customer may receive by opting in to the do-not-call list.
Id.
234

Id. at 796.
Id.
236
Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 732 (1970).
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
Carter, 455 F.3d at 796
235
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which the homeowners could not block.240 Therefore, the total power
to restrict all intrusions into the home which was enjoyed by the
homeowners in Rowan does not exist here.
CONCLUSION
Simply because the concurrence and majority come to the same
decision does not make the Carter court’s oversights irrelevant. Under
the majority’s test, there was no need to analyze the regulation for
content neutrality. If a restriction on charitable speech regulates on the
basis of content, then it is not a content neutral restriction and must be
analyzed under strict scrutiny.241 The plaintiff argues that the act is
“content-based regulation because its applicability requires analysis of
the content of the message in order to determine to which callers it
applies.”242
“If one must necessarily look at the content of the
speech to determine whether the law applies, then the
law is content-based.” Ark. Writers’ Project Inc. v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987). For example, a call
by one of the charities to educate a consumer is not
banned but if the call ends with a request for a donation
240

Unlike in Rowan, the state here has carved out particular categories of calls
the homeowner cannot block. These state-created carve-outs include not only
charitable calls made by volunteers and employees, but also certain calls by
newspaper organizations, real estate agents, and insurance agents. Thus, the
homeowner here does not have the plenary power to restrict all intrusions as the
homeowner could in Rowan. Instead, Indiana has actively immersed itself in
regulating the forms of telemarketing speech that homeowners are allowed to block:
a homeowner has unfettered discretion to block calls from professional
telemarketers, but lacks such discretion when it comes to, for example, calls initiated
by employees or volunteers of charities. Id. at 796 (Williams, J. concurring).
241
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 789 (1988); Vill. of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980); see Sec’y of
State of Maryland v. Munson, 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
242
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, at 21, Nat’l Coal. of Prayer v. Carter, No.053995 (7th Cir. July 28, 2006).
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it is banned. If that same call was placed by a volunteer
or a paid charitable employee it is exempt. An outside
fundraiser, paid the same wage, would be banned from
this speech.
The Act applies its restrictions based on the content of
the banned calls and the identity of the caller. A statute
that defines the speech it regulates by content, or
particular speakers, is evaluated as a content-based
restriction on speech. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 811-12.243
The concurrence rejects this content-based argument, stating:
“Although the question of whether the Indiana Act is a content neutral
regulation is a close one, it is nonetheless a ‘regulation that serves
purposes unrelated to the content of expression . . . even if it has
incidental effect on certain speakers or messages but not others.’”244
Analyzing the restriction for its content-neutrality is a hurdle which the
restriction must pass in order to be found constitutional. While the
argument fails, and the concurrence eventually arrives at the same
conclusion as the majority the restriction was at least analyzed for
content-neutrality.
The majority ignores the weight of Supreme Court precedent,
Seventh Circuit precedent, and the persuasive arguments of its sister
circuits,245 but is it relevant that the majority used the wrong test. The
concurrence, the Fourth, and the Eighth Circuits, all using a higher
level of scrutiny reached the same conclusion as the majority. The
result may have been the same, but what is relevant is that when a
government seeks to burden a right as fundamental as free speech, it is
the court’s duty to analyze that regulation in the manner dictated by
precedent. In this case, while the majority and concurrence reached the
same conclusion, the majority’s test allowed for a less strict review.
243

Id. at 21-22.
Nat’l Coal. of Prayer, 455 F.3d at 798-99 (citing Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791).
245
See Nat’l Fed’n for the Blind v. F.T.C, 420 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2005);
Fraternal Order of Police v. Stenehjem, 431 F.3d 591 (8th Cir. 2005).
244
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